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TAKEOVER: GERMAN REUNIFICATION 
UNDER A MAGNIFYING GLASS 
Mathias Reimann* 
THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GER­
MAN UNIFICATION. By Peter E. Quint. Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 482. $75. 
My first personal experience with the unification of my home 
country was an unlikely encounter in an unlikely place. In July 
1990, I was strolling across the Ponte Vecchio in Florence when I 
saw something so bizarre that it stopped me in my tracks. At the 
southern end of the bridge, deep in the pedestrian zone - off limits 
to automobiles - and right in the middle of the tourist crowd, was 
a lonely car, occupied by four obviously disoriented people. It was 
not just any car but a small, drab, and amusingly antiquated vehicle 
puffing bluish smoke from a whining two-stroke engine. I barely 
trusted my eyes: it was a "Trabbi,"1 the standard-issue East Ger­
man automobile. 
At this moment, I realized that the political landscape of Eu­
rope as I had known it no longer existed. In the world in which I 
grew up, citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were 
not allowed to drive out of Eastern Europe, and they did not have 
the Western currency to pay for such an adventure. There were 
simply no "Trabbis" on this side of the iron curtain. But in the pre­
vious fall, the Berlin wall had come down suddenly and, just a few 
days before my encounter in Florence, West German currency had 
been introduced in the GDR. Apparently these East Germans 
grabbed the first Deutschmarks available, jammed into their tiny 
car, drove across the previously impassable border, and braved the 
high-speed race on Western freeways in their hopelessly un­
derpowered vehicle to make a dream come true: to drive to Italy 
and see a world they knew only from postcards. 
As I watched these visitors from another world struggling to 
find a way out of their predicament, I understood that complete 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan and University of Trier, Germany. Dr. iur. 
1982, University of Freiburg; LL.M. 1983, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. "Trabbi" is a nickname for Trabant {"Satellite"). For decades, the Trabant was one of 
only two models of cars made by the German Democratic Republic {GDR) that were avail­
able to the average East German consumer. With the exception of a few East European 
models, foreign cars were by and large unavailable. Technologically 40 years behind Western 
automobiles, it became a cultural symbol of the former GDR in the period after 
reunification. 
1988 
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unification would only be a matter of time. In the end, it came 
much more quickly than most people deemed possible. 
I. A NATION REUNITED 
Peter Quint's The Imperfect Union2 describes and analyzes how, 
after forty-one years of separation, the two Germanies became one 
again. The story began to unfold almost a decade ago and has since 
become part of history. In order to understand what the book is 
about, it will be helpful to summarize briefly the major events.3 
In the late 1980s, the econoinic and political crisis in Eastern 
Europe accelerated and deepened. As glasnost took hold and the 
USSR began to crumble, President Gorbachev informed the East 
German government that it could no longer depend on support 
from its Inighty ally and would have to survive on its own. At this 
point, many GDR citizens sensed a historic opportunity to escape 
the communist regime. In late summer of 1989, in several Eastern 
European countries, East Germans attempted to break out by occu­
pying West German embassies - including the one in East Berlin 
- requesting that they be taken to the West. On September 11, 
Hungary punched a hole in the iron curtain through which East 
Germans could escape when it· broke rank with the Warsaw Pact 
states and opened its border with Austria. So many took advantage 
of the opportunity that the resulting hemorrhage threatened the 
very survival of the GDR. · 
At the same time, within the country itself, opposition to the 
communist regime took to the streets. The official celebrations of 
the GD R's 40th anniversary in the fall of 1989 prompted mass dem­
onstrations against the government. Without backing from the So­
viet Union, the regime did not dare quell the uprising and decided 
to yield. On October 18, long-time ruler Erich Honecker resigned 
and was replaced by the more moderate and reforinist Egon Krenz. 
Yet, it turned out that all efforts to save the GDR - mocked by 
English speakers as the "Gradually Disappearing Republic" - in 
its current form had come too late. Desperately trying to relieve 
the mounting public pressure, the Krenz government opened the 
Berlin Wall late on the night of November 9, 1989. As East 
Germans flooded into the West, one huge celebration engulfed the 
whole city of Berlin. 
At this point, however, even among the Germans, few expected 
imininent reunification. In fact, it seemed likely that the GDR 
2. Peter Quint is the Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of 
Maryland. 
3. The following summary is largely my own. Peter Quint recounts the most important 
events at various places in the book, most notably in chapter 3, pp. 15-21, chapter 7, pp. 56-
64, and chapter 8, pp. 65-72. 
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would survive for quite some time, albeit as a much more liberal 
and democratic state (pp. 19-20, 28). In December 1989, a "Round 
Table" of GDR leaders and public figures formed and began to 
work on constitutional reform, some members envisioning a com­
pletely new GDR constitution. Several measures gradually intro­
ducing democracy and pluralism were actually enacted in the 
following months (pp. 28-46). 
It was not until February and March 1990 that complete reunifi­
cation was considered a serious possibility. This turning of the tide 
was supported by two generally parallel developments. One took 
place within the GDR. On March 18, the first free election of the 
Volkskammer, the East German parliament, was held. It was won 
by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), which had governed the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) under Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl since 1982. This outcome demonstrated that the majority of 
the GDR population wanted unification with the FRG (p. 20). The 
new GDR government under Prime Minister Lothar de Maziere 
was a strangely ambivalent regime. On the one hand, it was the 
first - and last - freely elected GDR administration; on the other 
hand, it was largely dependent on its Western sister party, Kohl's 
CDU. Both parts of Germany were now essentially governed by 
the same party, the leadership of which pushed hard towards actual 
reunification. 
The second crucial development took place on the international 
level. In the spring of 1990, the Soviet leadership, itself under enor­
mous economic and political pressure, indicated that it might toler­
ate German reunification. To be sure, such tolerance would come 
at a price. The Soviet government expected not only important 
political concessions but also considerable financial aid from Ger­
many. Nevertheless, the path to unification was suddenly open and 
both German governments proceeded rapidly. 
On May 18, 1990, the FRG and the GDR signed the Treaty of 
Economic Union. When it took effect on July 1, the GDR began 
switching over to a Western capitalist market economy and intro­
duced the Deutschmark as its official currency (pp. 56-64). Shops 
offering Western consumer goods sprang up almost overnight, and 
four adventurous GDR citizens embarked on a journey to Florence. 
Only a few weeks later, on August 23, 1990, the Volkskammer 
voted for the GDR to accede to the Federal Republic.4 On August 
31, representatives of both States signed the Unification Treaty. It 
was quickly ratified by both legislatures. 
In the meantime, the Two-Plus-Four negotiations, between the 
two German states and the four World War II allies, advanced to-
4. As to the manner of unification - that is, accession of the GDR to the FRG - see 
infra Part III. 
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ward the renunciation of the rights that the allies still had with re­
gard to' Germany and, especially, Berlin. On September 12, after 
the principal players, the West German and Soviet governments, 
had reached agreement on the crucial issues, the Two-Plus-Four 
Treaty was signed. It provided for German reunification, accorded 
Germany full sovereignty,.and thus finally closed the post-World 
War II period in Europe (pp. 268-76). 
The Unification Treaty between the FRG and the GDR took 
effect on October 3, 1990.· On that day, the German Democratic 
Republic ceased to exist as it merged into the Federal Republic of 
Germany. At the same time, the newly reunited country, now com­
prising sixteen instead of eleven states and reaching from the Rhine 
to the Oder, became the largest and most populous nation in West­
ern Europe. 
Yet, soon after the celebrations ended, it became obvious that 
reunification was also an enormous burden and presented stagger­
ing problems. Who was fit to remain - or become - a judge, ad­
ministrator, or professor in the East? Who was going to own what 
property? Who could be prosecuted for which political crimes? 
Who was going to be spared or even rehabilitated? What ought to 
happen to the files of the Stasi, the East German secret service that 
had spied on its own citizens? What must be done to repair the 
desolate Eastern infrastructure and revive the moribund Eastern 
economy? And last, but not least, how would the bills be paid? 
II. A DEFINITIVE ACCOUNT 
The Imperfect Union, which grew out of a long article,5 presents 
both a narrative of the reunification process and a discussion of its 
most significant problems and consequences. Its twenty-four chap­
ters are grouped into three major parts. Part I covers the develop­
ments within the GDR from the revolution through unification -
that is, the one-year transition period from the fall of 1989 through 
November 1990. Part II examines the West German government's 
endeavor to extend the FRG's political, economic, administrative, 
and judicial structures. to the former GDR. Finally, Part III ad­
dresses the international context of reunification - the issues con­
cerning the European Union and NATO as well as the role of the 
reunited Germany in European and world politics. At first glance, 
this last part is somewhat surprising, but it turns out to be an essen­
tial and integral element of the whole picture. The intra-German 
events, we learn, were part of the continuing transformation of 
5. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 475 
(1991). 
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Europe, marked by the dissolution of the Eastern bloc as well as 
the integration and widening of the European Union. 
The coverage of the book is much broader than the subtitle, 
Constitutional Structures of German Unification, suggests. It is not 
limited to constitutional law and development at all. As Quint 
points out, he construes the term constitution broadly, as "ex­
tending to important international arrangements that help define 
the nature of a state, as well as certain central statutes, regulations, 
and practices that give concrete meaning to the underlying princi­
ples of a political system" (p. 6). Yet even this description is too 
narrow because the book is really an account of the unification pro­
cess as a whole, albeit with a strong emphasis on constitutional and 
other legal issues. It considers the historical and political back­
ground, discusses social and economic aspects, and even touches on 
psychological and emotional dimensions. The result is a rich and 
colorful picture that captivates the legal academic but is also rele­
vant to scholars from other disciplines and may actually interest an 
educated lay audience. 
The book has three particular strengths. First, it manages to 
present a detailed and accurate narrative in a very clear and reada­
ble fashion. There are a thousand trees, but there is also the whole 
forest. Thus, the book makes the complex process of German unifi­
cation intelligible without simplifying it. Second, The Imperfect 
Union provides thoughtful discussions of the major issues. Every 
chapter is an essay in its own right, focusing on specific aspects 
ranging from constitutional problems to property issues and from 
the divisive abortion question to the restructuring of the adminis­
trative and judicial systems. Many of Quint's analyses are subtle 
and thought provoking. Chapter Fourteen, for example, which 
deals with the prosecution of former GDR leaders and officials, 
summ arizes and weighs the major arguments in a few dense and 
perceptive paragraphs (p. 215). Finally, the book is critical but not 
partisan. Its criticism is always careful and mostly restrained; it be­
comes vociferous only where appropriate.6 As a result, Quint pro­
vides the reader with plenty of food for thought but leaves ample 
room to form one's own judgment. 
As a German reader, my initial reaction is amazement that an 
outsider could have written such an insightful book. But perhaps it 
is the very detachment of the outsider that enables Quint to capture 
the story and the issues with so much acumen and sympathy and in 
such an open-minded and balanced fashion.7 With many books, the 
6. See, e.g., pp. 148-51, 164, 290. 
7. This may also be true for Inga Markovits' account of the dissolution and rebuilding of 
the East German judiciary. See INGA MAru<ovrrs, IMPERFECT JusnCE: AN EAST-WEST 
GERMAN DIARY (1995). 
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price of such detachment is a lack of familiarity, an inability to cap­
ture the subtleties of tone and color, or a failure to achieve deeper 
understanding, but The Imperfect Union does not suffer from these 
deficiencies. This is probably because Quint spent considerable 
time in Germany during the critical period. He drew his informa­
tion not only from printed sources but also from talks with the peo­
ple involved in the ongoing events and from personal impressions 
and observations (p. ix). 
. 
In sum, The Imperfect Union is a very good book. It promises, 
and deserves, to become the definitive account of the legal and in­
stitutional aspects of German reunification. It certainly has no 
equal in English.8 Even in German, there is, at present, only an 
assortment. of detailed analyses of particular aspects of reunifica­
tion9 but no equally comprehensive study. In fact, it would be 
worthwhile to translate The Imperfect Union into German. 
As a reviewer, one feels obliged not only to praise but also to 
criticize. Thus, I should point out that The Imperfect Union is not a 
brilliant book. Yet, it does not try to be. Its goal is limited, but by 
no means modest: it promises to present an accurate account and 
profound analysis of German reunification, and it fulfills that prom­
ise admirably. A few more details, such as a chronological table of 
events, would be very useful to have, particularly for foreign read­
ers and as memories fade. In the end, however, the only true disap­
pointment is the book's Conclusion (pp. 311-15), which merely 
summarizes some of the material presented. It provides no general 
synthesis and no final perspective. This is a pity because Quint 
shows in many other contexts that he is capable of weaving differ­
ent strands together and extracting the fundamental questions as 
well as the possible answers from the complexity of the events. In 
the final chapter, however, he leaves the reader wondering whether 
there are any general themes that pervade the whole story. 
III. How THE EAST WAs WoN 
Such pervasive themes do in fact exist. The most important one 
is the basic manner in which German unification was pursued and 
accomplished. To understand this manner, it is necessary to con­
sider the challenges and the choices that presented themselves to 
the governments at the time. 
8. As far as I can see, the only competitor is RYsZARD W. P10TRow1cz & SAM K.N. 
BLAY, THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (1997). It is 
a much shorter and more black-letter account, more useful for quick reference than for 
deeper reflection. 
9. In particular, see the five-volume DEUTSCHE WIEDERVEREINIGUNG: DIE REcHTS­
EINHEIT (Klaus Stem ed., 1991-1993). 
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The fundamental challenge was to merge two very different 
countries. After four decades of membership in opposing Euro­
pean blocs, the two Germanies had different political, constitu­
tional, and legal systems; different administrative and educational 
structures; different economies; and different societies. The FRG 
was a fairly democratic state with a multiparty system and a liberal 
constitution committed to the rule of law. It sported a capitalist 
economy and a pluralist society. Its marketplace was driven by 
competition and demanded performance. Potential material re­
wards were high, but so were stress and anxiety levels. The welfare 
system was strong, but there were growing problems with unem­
ployment, homelessness, vandalism, and crime. In contrast, the 
GDR was a decidedly undemocratic, almost dictatorial, regime with 
a single-party monopoly, sham elections, a practically meaningless 
constitution, and a legal system under the thumb of the Party.10 It 
had a planned socialist economy and a rather uniform society with 
only small differences in wealth. Satisfaction with material living 
conditions was low, but so was stress. The social system was more 
highly developed than in the West, virtually guaranteeing everyone 
a job, a roof over the head, and the basic means of existence. Of 
course, these different environments conditioned their inhabitants 
in psychologically different ways. They bred different attitudes to­
ward the state and politics, the constitution and law, and public au­
thority and private property. Last but not least, they also made 
individuals view each other in different ways - in the West rather 
like competitors and strangers (that is, with considerable distrust), 
while in the East more as fellow sufferers (that is, with solidarity). 
In uniting these two different countries, there were, in principle, 
two options. The first was to create a new Germany, with each for­
mer part contributing whatever worthwhile elements it had to offer. 
The result would be a society built on compromise, a middle ground 
on which the citizens from both sides could meet. The second op­
tion was simply to extend West Germany eastward. The FRG 
would thus survive more or less unchanged, while the GDR would 
be wiped out, swallowed up by the West. The result would be a 
country characterized by decidedly Western values, lifestyles, and 
challenges to which Eastern citizens would have to adjust. The 
choice between these two options was as inevitable as it was 
fundamental. 
10. For a description of the GDR legal system, see DANIEL C. MEADOR, IMPRESSIONS OF 
LAW IN EAST GERMANY (1986). For a perceptive analysis of the Eastern conceptions of 
rights and law, see Inga Markovits, Law or Order - Constitutionalism and Legality in East­
ern Europe, 34 STAN. L. REv. 513 (1982); Inga Markovits, Pursuing One's Rights Under So­
cialism, 38 STAN. L. REv. 689 (1986); Inga Markovits, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights - An 
East-West German Comparison, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1978). 
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In the end, the politicians in charge chose the second option. To 
some extent, the triumph of the West was a foregone conclusion. 
Virtually nobody wanted to preserve the Eastern style of govern­
ment, single-party system, sham constitution, or planned economy. 
Yet, abandoning these features did not necessarily require whole­
sale endorsement of the current Western model, with both its 
strengths and its weaknesses. It would have been possible to draft a 
new, common constitution, to rewrite laws with a view to compro­
mise, to consider new economic models, and to work toward a soci­
ety in which both Westerners and Easterners might feel at home. 
Even in the West, voices called for such a course of renewal and 
compromise.11 But according to the course pursued by the West 
German CDU leadership, the new nation would not emerge from a 
mutual adjustment between its two former parts. There would be 
only a larger Federal Republic of Germany. A careful reader of 
The Imperfect Union will note that this choice characterized the 
whole unification process, for better or worse. 
The choice was most starkly presented, and is most easily dis­
cernible, on the constitutional level (pp. 47-55). In 1949, when the 
division of Germany became clear, the FRG's Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law), drafted as a temporary constitution for the new republic, ex­
pressly endorsed future reunification in its preamble. The docu­
ment listed two options to accomplish that goal.12 On the one hand, 
article 146 provided that "this Basic Law will lose its validity on the 
effective date of a constitution that has been chosen by the German 
people in a free decision."13 Thus, it seemed to envisage the draft­
ing of a new constitution on the occasion of reunification. On the 
other hand, article 23 provided that the Basic Law was to be 
adopted "in other parts of Germany after their accession [to the 
FRG]."14 In other words, the Basic Law could simply be extended 
to newly incorporated territory. The relationship between these 
two options was never settled with finality. Indeed, even the ques-
11. See, e.g., JENS REICH, ROcKKEHR NACH EUROPA: BERICHT ZUR NEUEN LAGE DER 
DEUTSCHEN NATION (1991); EINE VERFASSUNG FOR DEUTSCHLAND (Bernd Guggenberger et 
al. eds., 1991). 
12. In contrast, the GDR constitution of 1968, as revised in 1974, envisaged the division 
of Germany as final and thus did not provide for unification at all. P. 48. 
13. The translation is taken from The Imperfect Union, p. 49. After reunification, Article 
146 was redrafted. 
14. Article 23 in its original version has since become obsolete. After reunification, and 
after Germany's renunciation of all claims to the territory east of the Oder and Neisse (now 
Poland), there are no parts left to accede. Tue text of Article 23 thus has been replaced with 
a completely different provision dealing with the role of Germany in the European Union. 
See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 23 (F.R.G.). 
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tion as to whether article 146 required a new constitution upon uni­
fication remained open. is 
As a matter of fact, German reunification took place via article 
23. East Germany acceded to the FRG. Theoretically, the FRG 
had no choice but to accept the accession (pp. 52-53), but in reality 
the choice was, of course, made by the political leadership of both 
states. The consequences of choosing the path of article 23 were 
extremely far-reaching. To begin with, there would be no new con­
stitution for the reunited Germany and thus no constitutional com­
promise of any sort. Instead, the FRG's Basic Law simply became 
the constitution of the East. Even more important, however, was 
the effect on the subconstitutional level. As the GDR dissolved 
into the FRG, Western law suddenly applied in the Eastern states 
(pp. 108-10). Overnight, eighteen million former GDR citizens 
found themselves governed by a legal regime of which they knew 
next to nothing and which fit many of their needs poorly at best. 
Property rights in the East were suddenly determined by Western 
law (pp. 124, 151); the civil service, the judiciary, and the universi­
ties had to be reorganized according to Western principles (pp. 167, 
182); and even the East's newly drafted state constitutions had to 
conform to the Basic Law (pp. 82, 87). It is true that the Unifica­
tion Treaty addressed many of the problems of transition, providing 
interim solutions and gradual adjustment in several areas. But in 
the end, Eastern legal, administrative, and institutional structures 
were still replaced by those of the West. As a result, there was vir­
tually no mutual adjustment, harmonization of laws, or preservation 
of the considerable social advantages which some GDR law - for 
example, in the area of domestic relations - had offered (p. 109). 
Peter Quint clearly and accurately describes the overt extension 
of Western constitutional principles, legal rules, and institutional 
structures into the GDR. Yet, The Imperfect Union penetrates 
more deeply into the character of the unification process. It shows 
that "the spirit of article 23" triumphed over "the spirit of article 
146" (pp. 82, 87) on a much broader scale. In virtually every re­
gard, the FRG government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, pur­
sued a policy of rapid and radical Westernization of the East, 
stubbornly rejecting a course of mutual adjustment, compromise, or 
reform. illustrations of this approach abound. In February and 
March of 1990, Western political parties and party politics already 
had taken over East German election campaigns, marginalizing or 
eliminating the grassroots organizations and citizens' alliances that 
had carried the 1989 revolution (pp. 40-41). Soon thereafter, bu-
15. At least theoretically, there was a third option, namely the formation of a more or 
less loose confederation between the two countries for a transition period. As Quint points 
out, this idea was quickly abandoned. Pp. 47-48. 
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reaucrats in Western ministries drafted the Treaty of Economic 
Union and the Unification Treaty - documents of vast importance 
for the future of the country - with very little Eastern input. The 
treaties were then presented to the parliaments for ratification on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.16 The vast issues of real property rights 
lost through communist expropriation or by emigrants from the 
GDR were settled very much in favor of Western interests (pp. 123-
53). Much to the detriment of the Eastern economy, Eastern pro­
duction facilities were sold off or liquidated hastily, according to 
Western market principles (pp. 144-53). The civil service, the judi­
ciary, and the universities were restructured to conform with the 
Western model, entailing the replacement of the majority of East­
ern personnel by imports from the West.17 In all these matters, and 
others too numerous to mention, the former GDR was reshaped 
according to what Quint calls the "conservative tradition" (p. 4), 
that is, the political and social program of the conservative Chris­
tian Democratic government in the West. To add insult to injury, 
many of these measures were implemented by Western officials in a 
patronizing style and with little or no regard for Eastern concerns. 
Perhaps the only area in which a true compromise was sought, 
and found by the legislature, was that of abortion. First trimester 
termination of pregnancies had been legal in the GDR, but largely 
illegal in the FRG. After reunification and lengthy debates, the all­
German Bundestag enacted a liberal compromise that essentially 
legalized first trimester abortions. Yet, the Constitutional Court 
struck down important parts of this compromise as incompatible 
with the court's own highly conservative interpretation of the Basic 
Law.18 Even here, the Western model ultimately prevailed, depriv­
ing East German women of much of the freedom of choice they had 
enjoyed (pp. 154-65). 
By and large, however, the Constitutional Court softened the 
blows the East had to suffer. Many fundamental issues came before 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the form of constitutional ques­
tions. Time and again, the court interfered with the often ruthless 
pursuit of Western interests and thus decelerated the Westerniza­
tion of the East. It struck down the new election law as patently 
unfair to Eastern parties (pp. 68-69), required more compensation 
for lost property than the government had been willing to pay (pp. 
137-38), provided the East Germans who lost their jobs in the pub-
16. See pp. 57, 104-05. Tue drafting took place behind closed doors and without any 
public discourse. Pp. 57, 104-05. As far as I know, submitting these fundamental documents 
to a popular referendum was never even seriously considered. 
17. See pp. 166-93; MARKovrrs, supra note 7; see also Inga Markovits, Children of a 
Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist Germany, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2270 (1996). 
18. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerf GE] [Federal Consti­
tutional Court] 88 (1993), 203 (F.R.G.). 
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lie sector with at least some protection (pp. 169-71, 175-76), and 
limited the government's right to prosecute former East German 
spies (pp. 213-14) - FRG citizens who had spied in the GDR were 
of course not prosecuted. Thus, Quint rightly sees the Court as a 
mediator between Western and Eastern interests. Only the abor­
tion decision does not fit that pattern.19 
Notwithstanding the Court's insistence on compromise in most 
of the cases before it, Western structures, models, and interests pre­
vailed on an overwhelming scale. It is therefore somewhat mislead­
ing to speak of the "reunification" of the two countries. The term 
suggests a merger to which both parts cont ribute. Almost nothing 
of that sort occurred. A much more appropriate, and much more 
honest, term for what actually happened is "takeover." The FRG 
simply took over the GDR, just as one corporation takes over 
another.20 
IV. THE IMPERFECT UNION 
In principle, there is nothing wrong with takeovers, especially 
when they are the result of necessity. Indeed, the political course 
chosen by the German government has often been justified on the 
ground that it was the only way to get the job done. There is much 
to be said for this assertion. Extending Western structures eastward 
was undoubtedly the simplest, fastest, and surest way of accom­
plishing unification. This approach treated the whole problem as 
one of effective management, and it required little thought beyond 
the solution of technical matters. 
Yet takeovers come at a cost. Although the reshaping of East­
ern legal, judicial, and administrative structures according to the 
Western model has succeeded on a technical level, it has also en­
raged millions of East Germans who became frustrated with a new 
order that they did not understand and that cared little for their 
particular concerns. Similarly, the shock therapy applied to t he 
Eastern economy, exposing it to market forces with next-to-no ad­
justment period, has turned out to be a massive failure, resulting in 
the loss of almost half of all jobs (pp. 148-49). Almost a decade 
later, unemployment continues to be as high as productivity is low. 
These takeover costs are borne by the citizens in both parts of Ger­
many. The East has suffered high human costs; many citizens have 
failed to make the necessary transition and continue to feel lost in 
19. Quint is somewhat ambivalent on that point. He sees the Constitutional Court's 
abortion decision as yet another compromise, pp. 160, 163-64, but also admits that it "re­
mains quite far from a full recognition of the position reflected in the 1972 GDR statute," p. 
163. 
20. The takeover was "friendly" because the GDR government cooperated. Although 
the Eastern government actually voted for unification, it is highly questionable whether it 
would have supported in all regards the manner in which unification ultimately took place. 
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the new, competitive environment. In the West, the costs are pri­
marily :financial; Western taxpayers continue to pour billions of 
Deutschmarks into an East that looks more and more like a bot­
tomless pit. All this creates much mutual resentment and aliena­
tion. The wall in Berlin is gone but the "wall in the head" has by 
and large remained (p. 3). East and West will eventually grow to­
gether, but for the foreseeable future, their union will continue to 
be imperfect. 
It is therefore open to doubt whether unification, takeover-style, 
was the more prudent choice. But would a policy of mutual adjust­
ment and compromise have yielded better results? As with all such 
questions, there is no definite answer. Yet, one thing is clear: to 
reject such a policy meant to forego a historic opportunity to re­
think the premises on which the West was built and to reform Ger­
many - constitutionally, economically, and socially. 
Unfortunately, the political leadership lacked the will to rethink 
anything or to undertake any meaningful reform, even on a modest 
scale.21 In recent years, the consequences of this reluctance have 
become increasingly obvious as German voter frustration with ossi­
fied party politics grows, as the social system is subjected to mount­
ing pressure, and as the economy limps along. 
When all is said and done, therefore, German reunification is 
not only a success story but also one of missed opportunities. It was 
not only a great victory for Western democracy and market capital­
ism but also a costly defeat for the idea of critical reflection and the 
spirit of reform. Thus, upon closing The Imperfect Union, the 
reader is left both fascinated by the events and saddened by the 
stubborn conservatism and lack of imagination of the politicians 
and bureaucrats who orchestrated the takeover of the East. 
21. When the government created a commission in 1992 to undertake constitutional revi­
sions for the postunification age, it handed the job over to career politicians and bureaucrats. 
Unsurprisingly, the revision came to almost naught. Pp. 115-23. 
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